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"QUAFF ABLE, BUT FAR FROM TRANSCENDENT" 1 : 
MARYLAND'S TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROHIBITION 
"Anyone who has held a bottle of Grange 
Hennitage in one hand and a broken corkscrew in 
the other knows this to be a palpable injury." 
-Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It's happened to every wine aficionado, both casual and serious, 
in Maryland-she sits at her computer trying to locate on the 
Internet the balanced Pinot Noir she enjoyed at a restaurant the 
previous evening; locates the vineyard's website; clicks "purchase 
now;" and, suddenly, her purchase is brought to a surprising halt. 
Maryland consumers cannot legally purchase wine on the Internet, 
eliminating from their purchase thousands of varietals 
manufactured by small wineries, not carried in retail stores. 3 
Maryland's Byzantine liquor laws, the products of 1930's post-
Prohibition legislation, do not pennit direct shipment of wines to 
Maryland consumers. 4 
Following Prohibition and the adoption of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, most states adopted a similar statutory scheme to 
effectuate tax collection and to regain control over liquor from 
organized crime. 5 The statutes consisted of a three-tiered system, 
dominated by wholesale distributors. 6 The result is that 
wholesalers detennine what wines will be offered for sale in retail 
stores. 7 Further, it is economically logical that wholesalers choose 
wineries with a larger production over smaller wineries. 8 
Smaller wineries, therefore, have turned to alternative markets 
such as the Internet to sell their wines. 9 Ironically, it is the same 
statutory scheme that drives smaller wineries into the direct 
shipment market that forbids them from partaking in it-
1. SIDEWAYS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004); see Internet Movie Database, 
Memorable Quotes from Sideways (2004), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0375063 
Iquotes ("Quaffable, but uh ... far from transcendent."). 
2. 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). 
3. See infra Part II(C). 
4. See infra Parts 1I(8)-(C). 
5. See infra Part 11(8)(1) . 
6. See infra Part II(A)(I). 
7. See infra Part II(A)(3). 
8. Larger wineries, due to mass production, have more bottles available, larger 
advertising budgets, and lower prices, giving them a better chance of survival in 
the marketplace. See infra Part II(A)(3). 
9. See infra Part II(A)(4). 
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approximately half of all states forbid the direct shipment of wine 
to consumers. 10 
This conflict, the so-called "Wine Wars," II has ushered several 
industry members into litigation. The Supreme Court, in its 2005 
term, decided that states permitting direct shipment for in-state 
wineries, but forbidding it for out-of-state wineries, violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and are not justified by the Twenty-
first Amendment. 12 
Following this decision, the Maryland Comptroller's initial 
review of Maryland's direct shipment laws determined that the 
statutes passed constitutional muster. 13 However, a lawsuit filed in 
the United States District Court of Maryland at the end of 2005 
raises several legal issues that call the regulations into question. 14 
Specifically, Maryland law permits local wineries to circumvent 
the three-tiered system by selling their wines to restaurants and 
retailers, while not permitting out-of-state wineries selling more 
than 27,500 gallons a year to do the same. 15 
This Comment first examines the history and development of 
direct shipment laws following Prohibition. 16 Next, it assesses 
their validity under the Dormant Commerce Clause and determines 
whether they are saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. 17 
This Comment posits that Maryland's direct shipment laws are 
an antiquated result of post-Prohibition legislation, causing a 
detrimental impact to interstate commerce, and, therefore, violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 18 Justifications permitted by the 
Twenty-first Amendment, such as promotion of temperance, tax 
collection, and prevention of sales to minors, do not justify the 
direct shipment laws. 19 As such, Maryland's laws 
unconstitutionally restrict the consumer and the out-of-state wine 
producer. 20 
10. See infra Part Il(A). 
II. "Wine Wars" refers to the conflict of interests between boutique wineries, the 
wholesale and retail lobby, state legislators, and the courts. See Lisa Lucas, 
Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First 
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REv. 899 (2005). 
12. See infra Part II(A)(5). 
13. Michael Dresser, Maryland Wineries Are Told to Halt Direct Sales, BALT. SUN, 
Feb. 8,2006, at IA. 
14. See infra Part II(C)(3). 
15. See infra Part II(C)(3). 
16. See infra Parts II(A)-(B). 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Parts III(A)-(C). 
19. See infra Part III(D). 
20. See infra Part III. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Direct Shipment Bans 
"Here's to the corkscrew-a useful key to unlock 
the storehouse of wit, the treasury of laughter, the 
front door of fellowship, and the gate of pleasant 
folly." 
-W.E.P. French21 
1. Structure of Three-Tiered Distribution Schemes 
273 
Most states in the U.S. distribute wine and other alcoholic 
beverages through a three-tiered distribution system, a by-product 
of the post-Prohibition legislative flurry where states attempted to 
reign-in and maintain rigid control over alcohol sales. 22 The first 
tier in the system requires a wine producer to obtain a permit from 
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau in order to sell 
wine. 23 Next, the producer may sell wine to a licensed wholesaler, 
responsible for paying applicable taxes. 24 Finally, the wholesaler 
delivers wine to the licensed retailer, who may sell to the 
consumer, and collects sales taxes. 25 Direct shipment laws, which 
prevent an out-of-state retailer from selling liquor directly to the 
consumer, are integral to maintaining centralized control over 
alcohol sales. 26 
The three-tiered system developed after the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment in order to advance a number of the 
states' goals in regulating alcohol. 27 First, the top-level tier 
consisting of the wholesaler was intended to promote efficient 
collection of taxes and prevent sales to minors. 28 Second, by 
21. From the wine list of Commander's Palace in New Orleans, LA, courtesy of John 
McDonald. Dallas, TX, available at The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, 
http://www.wrathofgrapes.comlwinequot.html(last visited Mar. 24, 2007). 
22. Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anti-Competitive Barriers to E-Commerce: 
Wine 5-6 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf. 
23. Id. at 5. 
24. Id. 
25. /d. 
26. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679-80 (So. D. Tex. 2002). 
27. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6. 
28. Id. According to the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America ("WSW An): 
Part of the reason that the three-tiered system works so well is 
that the federal government, through the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act, and the states through related laws, require that 
there be an intermediary between the supplier and retail tiers 
designed to ensure that large suppliers with market power do not 
dominate individual retailers to the exclusion of other suppliers who 
might try to break into the market. In other words, the wholesale tier 
actually serves to blunt monopolistic supplier tendencies that had 
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gammg control of alcohol distribution, states hoped to wrestle 
control of alcohol sales from the tight hold that organized crime 
gained du:ring Prohibition. 29 Third, some states may have intended 
to keep alcohol prices unnecessarily high to promote temperance. 30 
2. Direct Shipment Bans 
"Direct shipping refers to wineries or retailers shipping wine 
directly to consumers outside the three-tiered system, usually to 
their home or work via a package delivery company such as FedEx 
[Corporation] (,FedEx') or United Parcel Service of America, Inc. 
('UPS,).,,3) Most states have banned direct shipment of all 
alcoholic beverages, including wine, in order to maintain 
centralized state control over liquor sales through the three-tiered 
system.32 Approximately twenty-four states permit direct 
shipment of wine;33 thirteen of these states have reciprocity laws 
permitting direct shipment from wineries outside the state if the 
prevailed prior to Prohibition . . .. A supplier must obtain approval 
for the label from the [Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau] 
and state authorities to ensure that it contains truthful and non-
misleading information and mandatory health warnings. That bottle 
must then be sold to a state and federally licensed wholesaler who is 
responsible for maintaining records and filing detailed reports 
tracking each bottle brought into the state, paying the excise taxes 
due on the alcohol, and delivering the alcohol to a state licensed retail 
establishment. The retailer is responsible for paying over to the state 
the sales taxes generated by each sale, and is directly responsible for 
ensuring that alcohol does not fall into the hands of minors or other 
prohibited individuals. Since both the wholesaler and the retailer 
must be licensed by the state, they are fully accountable for any 
dereliction of their duties. They are subject to on-site inspections, 
auditing and compliance checks, and any violation can result in the 
loss of license, fines and other potentially more severe penalties. 
Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Position Paper 2 (Oct. 8, 2002), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panel/gray.pdf. 
29. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6. According to the WSW A: 
By channeling the physical distribution of beverage alcohol 
through licensed in-state wholesalers and retailers, the state can 
effectively enforce its sales and tax policies (including barring sales 
to minors, protecting dry areas, limiting strength, controlling labels 
and advertising and the like) because it can license, inspect, and hold 
responsible these local firms. 
Position Paper, supra note 28, at 2-3. 
30. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6. 
31. ld. at 7. 
32. See id. 
33. ld. at 7; see Wine Institute, Who Ships Where, http://wi.shipcompliant.com/ 
WhoShipsWhere.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). States that permit shipment 
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, D.C., and Wyoming. !d. 
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"[s]tate of origin affords similar nondiscriminatory treatment.,,34 
Most interstate direct shipments are prohibited in the remaining 
twenty-six states. 35 
3. Dynamics of the Wholesale and Direct Shipping Markets 
a. Wholesalers' Interests 
The Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc. ("WSWA") 
represents 450 wholesaler companies in forty-two states; its 
wholesalers distribute more than 90 percent of all wine and spirits 
sold in the U.S. 36 Wholesale distributing is a multi-billion dollar 
industry. 37 The wholesaler industry has successfully lobbied to 
make direct shipping a felony.38 At least eight states have passed 
felony legislation,39 including Maryland. 40 
The number of licensed wholesalers has declined, "from several 
thousand in the 1950s to a few hundred today.,,41 "The top five 
wholesalers now account for a third of the total market.,,42 As the 
wholesalers' market share increases, the industry can exert its 
influence over suppliers for grice reductions while demanding 
higher prices from retailers. 3 The wholesaler industry also 
lobbies state and federal governments for protectionist state liauor 
laws, which enable the wholesalers' domination of the market.4 
34. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005). States that permit reciprocal 
shipping include Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Wine Institute, Who Ships Where, 
supra note 33. 
35. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8. States that prohibit shipment 
include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee and Utah. Wine Institute, Who Ships 
Where, supra note 33. 
36. Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., About Us, http://www.wswa.org/ 
public/about/who.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
37. James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment 
Laws Are a Violation o/the Commerce Clause, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 169, 173 
(2001). 
38. !d. 
39. Id. 
40. See Wine Institute, Who Ships Where, supra note 33. Maryland officials cited the 
difficulty in pursuing out-of-state violators on misdemeanor charges. Patrick 
Thibodeau, State Liquor Law a Backlash Against Internet Merchants, 
COMPUTER WORLD, Oct. 4, 1999, at 24. 
41. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8. 
42. Molnar, supra note 37, at 173. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 173-74. 
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b. The Direct Shipping Wine Market 
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") asserts that the number 
of wineries has increased dramatically from 1975 to 2003: from 
500-800 to well over 2,000. 45 Many of these new wineries are 
small operations producing approximately 3,500 cases of wine 
annually.46 While the number of small wineries has increased, the 
number of available wholesalers has decreased. 47 This places 
pressure on wholesalers to select wines with the best chance of 
survival on the market: those with large marketing budgets and 
large quantities of wines.48 Smaller wineries do not produce 
sufficient quantities of product to accommodate distributors. 49 
Even if wholesalers distributed smaller wineries' products, the 
additional cost of the wholesaler middleman would substantially 
reduce the small wineries' profits. 50 Many industry experts, 
including the FTC, have concluded that direct shipment could 
substantially increase profits for smaller wineries through the 
opening of additional markets, such as Internet sales. 51 
4. Direct Shipment Laws are a Barrier to Electronic Commerce 
"The value of the direct sale of wine is estimated at $500 
million with some estimates as high as $1 billion.,,52 A 2003 FTC 
study determined that state laws banning interstate direct shipping 
are the single largest impediment to expanded electronic commerce 
in wine. 53 The FTC conducted a study in Virginia, a state that 
banned direct shipping at the time of the study, to determine the 
scope of wine availability and pricing issues. 54 Of the wines 
surveyed, fifteen of the eighty-three wines were unavailable in the 
searched Virginia outlet stores, while seventy-nine of the eighty-
three wines were available through online retail outlets. 55 The 
study also found that a Virginia consumer could save money by 
45. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 8. 
46. Molnar, supra note 37, at 174. 
47. Kevin Atticks, Oh the Times, They Are a Changing, THE MARYLAND WINERIES, 
http://www.marylandwine.comlmwallaws/deliverys.html. 
48. ld. 
49. Molnar, supra note 37, at 174. 
50. ld. Boutique wineries produce a small supply, requiring that they sell their 
product at a higher price. See id. The wholesaler markup would cut into this 
profit margin, making a middleman less feasible. ld. However, large wineries 
make their profit from selling in bulk, which is more conducive to a wholesaler 
middleman relationship. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 6. 
5l. See Atticks, supra note 47; Federal Trade Commission,supra note 22, at 14. 
52. Molnar, supra note 37, at 173. 
53. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 14. 
54. ld. at 17-18. 
55. ld. at 18. 
2007] Maryland's Twenty-First Century Prohibition 277 
purchasing online; consumers could save an avera~e of $4.40 to 
$7.19 per bottle for wines priced at $20.00 or more. 5 
The FTC concluded: 
[T]he quantitative findings likely understate the 
impact of the direct shipment ban on variety. Since 
the entire 83-bottle sample consisted of the more 
popular wines, it excluded thousands of lesser-
known labels that bricks-and-mortar retailers may 
not have carried, and that consumers may not have 
known. In addition, to the extent that individuals 
had heterogeneous and strongly-held preferences, 
consumers who sought to purchase these wines may 
have been significantly worse off if they settled for 
less-preferred substitutes. 57 
While it is clear that economically speaking, direct shipment 
bans have a negative impact on consumer choice and the 
development of niche markets, the question of their 
constitutionality remains unanswered. The Supreme Court began 
to broach the question in Granholm v. Heald. 
5. Granholm v. Heald58 
The Supreme Court held in two consolidated cases that it is a 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause "to allow in-state 
wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to 
prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing so, or, at least, to make 
direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint.,,59 The 
Court invalidated New York and Michigan laws restricting out-of-
state direct wine sales.6o Both Michigan's and New York's 
regulatory schemes imposed three-tiered distribution systems 
requiring separate licenses for producers, wholesalers, and 
retailers. 61 The Court reaffirmed the principle that three-tiered 
distribution schemes are constitutional under the Twenty-first 
Amendment. 62 However, Michigan's and New York's three-tiered 
systems were applicable only to out-of-state wineries; in-state 
wineries were able to obtain direct-sale licenses. 63 The Court 
noted that the "discrimination substantially limits the direct sale of 
56. Id. at 19. 
57. Id. at 22. 
58. 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
59. /d. at 465-66. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 466. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. at 467. 
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wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and significant 
b · ,,64 usmess. 
The plaintiffs in the suits represented small wineries unable to 
fulfill requests from consumers in Michigan and New York due to 
the states' bans on direct sales.65 In order to ship to consumers in 
these states, the wineries were required to find a wholesaler to 
complete the "direct" sales; however, the wholesaler's markup 
would "render shipment . . . economically infeasible.,,66 In 
Michigan, out-of-state wineries may purchase a $300 "outside 
seller of wine" license while a small in-state winery may purchase 
a "wine maker" license for $25. 67 
The Court has long maintained that laws burdening out-of-state 
economic interests and benefiting in-state economic interests 
violate the Commerce Clause.68 "State laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce face 'a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity. ,,,69 
Michigan and New York argued that their laws were permitted 
under the Webb-Kenyon Act. 7o The Court rejected this reading of 
the Webb-Kenyon Act, arguing that the Act cannot be construed as 
"removing any barrier to discriminatory state liquor regulations" or 
favoring discrimination of out-of-state liquors. 71 
Michigan and New York further argued that Section 2 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment grants the states "the authority to 
discriminate against out-of-state goods."n The Court disagreed, 
holding that the cited history provides support for the argument 
that Section 2 "restored to the states the powers they had under the 
[pre-Prohibition] Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.,,73 The Court 
opined that the goal of the Twenty-first Amendment was to give 
the states a framework to control liquor "by regulating its 
transportation, importation, and use,,,74 but it does not permit the 
states. to discriminate against out-of-state products by giving 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 468. 
66. See id. 
67. /d. at 469. 
68. Id. at 472 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994)). 
69. /d. at 476 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,624 (1978)). 
70. See id at 481-83; see supra Part I1(B)(1). 
71. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 462. "The Webb-Kenyon Act readily can be construed as 
forbidding 'shipment or transportation' only where it runs afoul of the State's 
generally applicable laws governing receipt, possession, sale, or use." Id. at 482 
(citing McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 141 (1932)). 
72. Id. at 484. 
73. Id.; see infra Part II(B)(I). 
74. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
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preference to their own, contrary to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. 75 
Michigan and New York argued that the regulations advance 
legitimate state purposes that cannot be served without 
nondiscriminatory means: first, prevention of minors from 
obtaining alcohol and second, "facilitating tax collection.,,76 The 
Court relied on a FTC study stating that the purchase of wine over 
the Internet by minors is not a problem. 77 In addition, the Court 
believed states could impose less restrictive preventative measures 
such as requiring an adult signature upon delivery. 78 
The Court did recognize that permitting direct shipping carries 
the risk of tax evasion. 79 However, the Court pointed to 
Michigan's "licensing and self-reporting" regulations utilized 
within the three-tiered system and reasoned that those schemes 
would also suffice for direct shipments. 80 The Court concluded 
that Michigan's and New York's stated legislative goals cannot 
adequately justify a need for discrimination consistent with the 
Twenty-first Amendment or the Commerce Clause. 81 
To properly understand the evolution of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause-Twenty-first Amendment interplay, it is 
necessary to examine how alcohol regulations came to exist on the 
federal level, beginning with pre-Prohibition legislation. 
B. History of Federal Alcohol Regulation 
"If God forbade drinking, would He have made 
wine so good?" 
-Cardinal Richeleu 82 
1. Wilson Act and Webb-Kenyon Act 
Prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
prohibition of all alcoholic beverages, the temperance movement 
sought to reduce sales of alcoholic beverages through a state by 
state approach. 83 "[M]any states passed laws restricting or 
75. See id. at 486. 
76. Id. at 489. 
77. Id. at 490. Some argue that minors would prefer beer or liquor to wine and a 
"quick fix" in lieu of waiting several days for a shipment. Further, teenagers 
generally consume cheaper wines, not higher priced boutique wines. Federal 
Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 12. 
78. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490-91. 
79. Id. at 491. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 493. 
82. The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21. 
83. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. 
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prohibiting the sale of alcohol. ,,84 The Supreme Court was 
amenable to upholding laws restricting sales and production, but 
unwilling to uphold laws related to imports. 85 
The Court invalidated a number of such state liquor laws based 
on the Commerce Clause and "advanced two distinct principles.,,86 
First, states were not permitted to discriminate against imported 
liquor under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 87 Second, states 
could not constitutionally pass "facially neutral laws that placed an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.,,88 Prior to 
Prohibition, states struggled to regulate the importation, 
transportation, and manufacture of liquor, while Congress, under 
its Commerce Clause powers, attempted to maintain control over 
the issue. 89 Following a series of cases invalidating state laws, 
Congress passed the Wilson Act,90 which enabled the states to 
regulate out-of-state liquor "to the same extent and in the same 
manner" as liquor produced in-state. 91 The Court's reading of the 
Wilson Act affirmed the line of cases "striking down state laws 
that discriminated against liquor produced out of state.,,92 The text 
of the Wilson Act reads as follows: 
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating 
liquors or liquids transported into any State or 
Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, 
sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such 
State or Territory be subject to the operation and 
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted 
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same 
extent and in the same manner as though such 
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State 
or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by 
reason of being introduced therein in original 
packages or otherwise. 93 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476-77 (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 91 (1897); 
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446,461 (1886); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123, 
126 (1880». The Dormant Commerce Clause is "[t]he constitutional principle 
that the Commerce Clause prevents state regulation of interstate commercial 
activity even when Congress has not acted under its Commerce Clause power to 
regulate that activity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004). 
88. Id. at 477 (citing Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,414-16 (1898); Vance v. W.A. 
Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 444 (1898); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108-
09 (1890); Bowan v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1888». 
89. Id. at 476-78. 
90. 27 U.S.c. § 121 (2000). 
91. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478 (quoting 27 U.S.c. § 121). 
92. Id. at 483. 
93. 27 U.S.C. § 121. 
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The Court, interpreting the Wilson Act, determined that states were 
permitted to regulate the resale of imported liquor, leaving 
consumers the ability to receive direct shipment of liquors for 
personal use. 94 Thus, liquor sales by mail order flourished. 95 
In response, Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act. 96 The text 
of the Act provides: 
The shipment or transportation . . . of any 
spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other 
intoxicating liquor of any kind from one State . . . 
into any other State . . . which said spirituous, 
vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating 
liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, 
to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner 
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in 
violation of any law of such State . . . is 
prohibited. 97 
The constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act under the 
Commerce Clause was called into question but a divided Court 
upheld the law. 98 The Court determined that the Webb-Kenyon 
Act permitted states to forbid direct shipments of liquor to 
consumers so lon~ as the states treated in-state and out-of-state 
products similarly. 9 
The Court interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act as extending that 
which was intended under the Wilson Act-specifically, to 
eliminate the "regulatory advantage" of immunity under the 
Commerce Clause granted to imported liquor under Bowman and 
Rhodes. 100 
In 1919, the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited 
all liquor and rendered all legal questions regarding the Webb-
Kenyon Act moot; however, Prohibition ended fourteen years later 
with the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. 101 
94. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 480 (citing Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412,421-26 
(1898)). 
95. [d. 
96. 27 U.S.c. § 122 (2000); see Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481. 
97. 27 U.S.c. § 122. 
98. See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325-32 (1917). 
99. /d. at 321-22. 
100. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 482 (citing Clark Distilling, 242 U.S. at 324). 
101. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
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2. Twenty-first Amendment, Section 2 
"For when the wine is in, the wit is out .... " 
-Thomas Becon, The Catechism 375 102 
[Vol. 36 
The speedy and unprecedented ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment served two primary purposes: it repealed prohibition 
under the Eighteenth Amendment and gave states the power to 
control interstate transportation and importation of intoxicating 
liquors. 103 The corresponding wording of the latter provision is 
contained in Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment: "The 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited." 104 However, this clause applied literally appears to 
conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause, thus raising the 
question, which clause controls? 
The legislative intent behind the Twenty-first Amendment has 
been intensely debated since its enactment, especially because of 
its complex relationship with the Dormant Commerce Clause. 105 
Some legal scholars argue that Section 2 provided the states full 
control over liquor, unrestricted "by other constitutional provisions 
or the earlier nondiscrimination principle in the Wilson Act;" other 
scholars argue that Section 2 merely granted states the same 
powers they had prior to Prohibition. 106 Cases decided soon after 
Congress passed the Twenty-first Amendment interpreted the 
Amendment as giving states absolute authority over liquor control, 
favoring the Twenty-first Amendment over other constitutional 
provisions. 107 However, modem Twenty-first Amendment 
jurisprudence has rejected this approach and instead utilizes a 
theory that balances the Twenty-first Amendment with other 
constitutional provisions, including the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. 108 
102. The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21. 
103. Lucas, supra note II, at 901. 
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
105. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673,678 (S.D. Tex. 2002), ajJ'd, 
336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003). 
106. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
107. See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 
(1936); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n of Mich., 305 U.S. 
391, 394 (1939) (referring to the "substantive power of the State to prevent the 
sale of intoxicating liquor"). 
108. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486-87 (2005) (noting that "[t]he Court 
has applied this rule in the context of the First Amendment . . . ; the 
Establishment Clause ... ; the Equal Protection Clause ... ; the Due Process 
Clause, ... ; and the Import-Export Clause .... "). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (First Amendment); Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (Establishment Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
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In recent years, court opinions on the issue run the gamut, 
depending on: 
(1) [W]hether the judge interprets the 
amendment as providing nearly absolute plenary 
power to the states under § 2 of the twenty-first 
amendment . . . or (2) whether the judge applies 
more recent Supreme Court developments in 
dormant commerce clause analysis and balancing 
tests and gives prominence to economic 
discrimination resulting from a state's disparate 
application of its regulatory scheme to favor local 
d 109 pro ucers .... 
For example, in 1986, the Supreme Court stated, "the Twenty-first 
Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcohol 
from the reach of the Commerce Clause."llo The Court's most 
recent iteration of the interplay between the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment is detailed in the 
landmark case of Granholm v. Heald: 
The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment was to 
allow States to maintain an effective and uniform 
system for controlling liquor by regulating the 
transportation, importation, and use. The 
Amendment did not give States the authority to pass 
nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against 
out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed 
at any earlier time. III 
In Granholm, the Court determined that a "State which chooses 
to ban the sale ... of alcohol altogether could bar its importation; 
and . . . it would have to do so to make its laws effective . . . . 
State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment 
when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its 
domestic equivalent." I 12 
190 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 
(1971) (Due Process Clause); Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 
377 U.S. 341 (1964) (Import-Export Clause). 
109. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79. 
110. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 
(1986). 
Ill. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484-85. 
112. Id. at 488-89. 
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C. Maryland's Wine Industry 
1. Maryland Makes Wine? 
Maryland's wine industry began in the 1600s, when Governor 
Charles Calvert planted 200 acres of European grapes on the east 
bank of the St. Mary's river. 113 In 1984, the Maryland wineries 
formed the Maryland Wineries Association and with it, the first 
Maryland Wine Festival. 114 The Association launched its first 
cooperative marketing campaign in 2001, and, in 2004, Governor 
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. formed the Maryland Wine and Grape 
Advisory Committee to investigate growth in the industry. I IS 
Currently, there are twenty wineries operating in Maryland. 116 
Two thousand and four was a record-breaking year for the 
industry-sales were estimated at over $7 million, a 22.5 percent 
increase from 2003. 117 
. 2. Maryland Law Grants Benefits to Maryland Wineries 
Maryland law bans direct shipments from producers to 
consumers and applies to both out-of-state and in-state wineries. I IS 
While Maryland wineries may not ship wines directly to resident 
consumers, state law, until recently, permitted local wineries to sell 
and deliver wine directly to individuals and retailers outside of the 
wholesale scheme. 119 In-state wineries were eligible for licenses 
that permitted them to sell their wines directly to licensed retail 
wine dealers, including restaurants. 120 Out-of-state wineries were 
not eligible for these licenses; instead, they were forced to 
113. The Maryland Wineries, History of Maryland Wine, http://www.marylandwine. 
comlmwalleammore/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 24,2007). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. The Maryland Wineries, Maryland Wine Industry Statistics, http://www.maryland 
wine.comlmwalleammore/stats.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). 
117. Id. 
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1 (2005). The law provides: 
A person in the business of selling or distributing alcoholic 
beverages in or from another state may not ship, cause to be shipped, 
or deliver alcoholic beverages directly to a recipient in this State if 
the seller, distributor, shipper, transporter, or recipient does not hold 
the requisite license of permit under this article . . .. [This 
prohibition] ... includes alcoholic beverages that are ordered or 
purchased through a computer network. . .. A person who violates 
this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to a fine 
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or both. 
!d. 
119. See Complaint at 14, Bushnell v. Ehrlich, 2005 WL 3673790 (D. Md. Nov. 18, 
2005). 
120. !d. at 15. See also MD. CODE REGS. 03.02.01.03 (2006); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, 
§§ 1-201,7-101,12-107,16-506.1. 
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negotiate the wholesale system to sell their products in 
Maryland. 121 
3. Bushnell v. Ehrlich's Threat to Maryland Law 122 
Following the Granholm decision, a Pennsylvania vintner in 
Bushnell v. Ehrlich challenged Maryland's regulations alleging 
that the State gives preferential and unconstitutional treatment to 
local wineries by permitting them to sell their wines directly to 
restaurants and retailers. 123 Recognizing the viability of this claim, 
the Maryland Comptroller attempted to preserve Maryland law. 
He reinterpreted the statute that gave local wineries the ability to 
sell their wines to local restaurants and retailers. By nulling the 
statute, the Comptroller forced local wineries, in sixty days, to find 
wholesalers to sell their wines. 124 Under advice of the Maryland 
Attorney General's Office, the Comptroller believed that 
reinterpreting the regulation was the only option to prevent 
Maryland's anti-direct shipment laws from being struck down on 
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 125 The unfortunate result of 
this action was an uncertain future for Maryland wineries, most of 
whom produce too little wine to attract wholesaler interest. 126 
The Maryland Legislature could have responded to the Bushnell 
threat in three possible ways: First, legislators might have repealed 
the benefits to local wineries so that out-of-state wineries were on 
par; second, legislators could have altered the three-tiered system 
to permit direct shipping for both in-state and out-of-state wineries; 
third, legislators may have continued to disallow direct shipment 
but permit in-state and out-of-state wineries to deal directly with 
retailers and restaurateurs. 127 
Responding to public outcry in defense of Maryland's wineries, 
the Maryland Legislature struck a last minute compromise with 
then Governor Ehrlich and the competing industries. 128 The new 
legislation permits "wineries that produce less than 27 ,500 ~allons 
annually" to apply "for a limited wholesaler's license.,,12 The 
wholesaler's license permits these smaller wineries to sell directly 
to retailers and restaurants. 130 By permitting smaller wineries to 
121. See Complaint, supra note 119, at 16. See also MD. CODE REGS. 03.02.01.03 
(2006); MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § § 1-20 I, 7-10 I, 12-107, 16-506.1. 
122. Complaint, supra note 119. 
123. !d. at 14-16. 
124. Dresser, supra note 13, at 6A. 
125. !d. 
126. [d. at IA. 
127. [d. 
128. Andrew Green, Wine Bill Compromise Struck, BALT. SUN, Apr. 7,2006, at 5B. 
129. [d. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201 (Supp. 2006). 
130. Green, supra note 128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201. 
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act as their own wholesalers, state officials sidestepped litigation 
that would likely have forced Maryland to permit direct shipment. 
III. ANAL YSIS 
"Wine is bottled poetry." 
-Robert Louis Stevenson 131 
To date, no Supreme Court case has directly addressed the 
constitutionality of direct shipment laws in general. I32 However, 
the Court did determine in Granholm that New York and 
Michigan's direct shipping regulations, treating in-state and out-of-
state shippers differently, violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. 133 This Comment posits that under modem Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, direct shipping laws are 
unconstitutional-specifically, Maryland's direct shipping laws are 
unconstitutional. 
A. Commerce Clause Analysis 
The Supreme Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New 
York State Liquor Authority articulated a two-tiered approach to 
analyze state economic interests under the Commerce Clause. 134 
The Court explained that if a state statute facially 
regulates or discriminates against interstate 
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state 
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we 
have generally struck down the statute without 
further inquiry .... When, however, a statute only 
has indirect effects on interstate commerce and 
regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether 
the State's interest is legitimate and whether the 
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the 
local benefits. 135 
The Court has consistently held that strict scrutiny must be applied 
when examining Dormant Commerce Clause cases.136 Thus, when 
its direct shipping regulations are challenged, a state must prove 
that its laws are "closely related to its powers reserved by the 
twenty-first amendment and that the statutes promote core 
concerns of that amendment." 137 
131. The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21. 
132. Molnar, supra note 37, at 178. 
133. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005). 
134. 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). 
135. Id. at 579. 
136. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673,682 n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
137. /d. 
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B. Core Concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment 
Bacchus v. Dias directs us to weigh the core concerns of the 
Twenty-first Amendment against policies that seemingly violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 138 However, the core concerns of 
the Twenty-first Amendment's drafters are controverted. 
Legal scholars have debated the issue but have not formed a 
solid conclusion. Duncan Baird Douglass conducted a detailed 
review of the legislative history of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
utilizing "comments of various senators during the ratification 
debates to support three different interpretations of § 2:" First, the 
provision did not exempt states from any part of the Constitution 
and returned authority to regulate liquors to the states; second, that 
states wanting to remain dry after the Eighteenth Amendment was 
repealed would have the authority to do so; or third, the 
Amendment exemRted state liquor regulation from Commerce 
Clause limitations. 39 
After reviewing the debates, Douglass concluded: 
The Twenty-first Amendment garnered the 
requisite two-thirds vote ... probably because most 
members of Congress saw section one, the simple 
repeal of constitutional Prohibition, as the bulk of 
the Amendment's purpose and substance. It seems 
that sections two and three of the Amendment were 
seen as being primarily procedural sections, 
necessary to support and implement section one ... 
. [S]ubstantive debate ... focused principally on 
two subjects: whether the text should explicitly 
prohibit saloons and the means of ratifying the 
Amendment. The meaning of ... section two . . . 
was subjected to limited scrutiny. 140 
Douglass concluded "[t]he plain meaning of the text and the 
legislative history, taken together, do not reveal a single, correct 
interpretation of the effect the Amendment ha[ s] on state authority 
138. Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). "State laws that constitute mere 
economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as laws 
enacted to combat the perceived evils of unrestricted traffic in liquor." Id. at 276. 
139. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (citing Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, 
Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in 
Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1628-36 (2000». 
140. Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the 
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation 
of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631-32 
(2000). 
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.,,141 Thus, the varying approaches that district court judges 
have taken range from an expansive analysis to a more narrow 
approach. 142 
Without a clear historical approach, the Supreme Court has 
determined that the core concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment 
include "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market 
conditions, and raising revenue .... ,,143 It is important to note that 
economic protectionism is not a core concern of the Twenty-first 
Amendment; "[t]he central purpose of the provision was not to 
empower states to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers 
to competition."I44 Further, "[s]tate laws that constitute mere 
economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same 
deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an 
unrestricted traffic in liquor." 145 
The proper recourse, then, is to first apply traditional Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis. 146 If the law does not pass strict 
scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court must 
determine whether the state has demonstrated that there are no 
reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing the Twenty-first 
Amendment's core concerns. 147 
C. Applying Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to Maryland's 
Direct Shipment Laws 
"The wines that one best remembers are not 
necessarily the finest that one has ever tasted, and 
the highest quality may fail to delight so much as 
some far more humble beverage drunk in more 
favorable surroundings." 
-H. Warner Allen 148 
Unlike the statutes at issue in Granholm, Maryland's direct 
shipment laws treat in-state and out-of-state wineries similarly-
neither are permitted to ship wine directly to Maryland consumers; 
the regulations at issue are thus facially neutra1. 149 Until April 
141. Id. at 1636. 
142. Compare Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (ruling Texas ban on direct shipment 
from out-of-state suppliers was unconstitutional), with Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-
Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (2000) (holding Indiana ban on direct shipment from out-
of-state suppliers was authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment). 
143. North Dakota v. U.S., 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). 
144. Bacchus Imp. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). 
145. Id. 
146. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2003), affd by Granholm v. Heald, 
544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
147. Engler, 342 F.3d 517. 
148. The Wrath of Grapes, Quotable Quotes, supra note 21. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
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2006, Maryland law permitted local wineries to circumvent the 
wholesale system, granting local wineries unconstitutional 
preferential treatment over out-of-state wineries. ISO Under the 
Brown-Forman analysis, these regulations do not pass 
constitutional scrutiny. lSI 
The intended result of the Bushnell litigation-legalizing direct 
shipment-was not achieved. Instead, Maryland residents may see 
a slight increase in the availability of wines produced by very 
small wineries in local liquor stores. IS2 The April 2006 
compromise permits small vintners to serve as their own 
wholesalers, but does not permit direct shipment to consumers. IS3 
Moreover, the regulations only permit out-of-state wineries 
producing 27,500 gallons of wine per year to sell to retailers. 154 
Wineries producing more than 27,500 gallons per year must attract 
wholesaler attention to carry their product. Initially, wine industry 
advocates proposed a 250,000 gallon limit but the wholesale lobby 
resisted, settling on the 27,500 gallon compromise. 155 Wholesale 
industry advocates also rejected a 40,000 gallon proposal.IS6 The 
27,500 gallon compromise is a contrived measure designed to 
permit only the smallest wineries entry to the Maryland market, 
enabling the legislature to avoid the direct shipment issue 
altogether. 
Instead of permitting Bushnell litigation to proceed, the 
Maryland Legislature paid lip service to the out-of-state wine 
industry by placing a legislative band-aid on the direct shipment 
issue. This Comment posits that under Brown-Forman analysis,IS7 
any legislative result short of permitting direct shipment for both 
in-state and out-of-state wineries is unconstitutional. 
Under the first half of the Brown-Forman analysis, Maryland's 
facially neutral direct shipping laws pass Dormant Commerce 
Clause strict scrutiny.IS8 However, Brown-Forman next mandates 
that "when ... a statute ... has only indirect effects on interstate 
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we ... [examine] whether 
150. See Complaint, supra note 119, at 14-28. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
152. See David Dishneau, Small Wineries Raise a Glass, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2006, 
at CI4. 
153. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-201(v)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2006). 
154. /d. 
ISS. Dishneau, supra note 152, at CIS. 
156. Julekha Dash, Compromise Will Allow Md. 's Wine Makers to Continue Selling to 
Restaurants, WASH. Bus. J., AprilS, 2006, available at http://phoenix.hizjournals 
.comlwashingtonlstories/2006/04/03/daily I 7.html. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
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the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on 
interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." 159 
Maryland's anti-direct shipment law, while facially neutral, has 
a prejudicial effect on out-of-state wineries and thus constitutes 
functional discrimination. This Comment will further examine the 
benefits that local wineries enjoy. 
1. Market for Maryland Wines 
The local market for Maryland wines is booming; in 2004, sales 
were estimated at over $7 million, a 22.5 percent increase from 
2003. 160 The Mazland Wineries Association's "Ask for Maryland 
Wine" campaign I I and Maryland laws permitting local vintners to 
circumvent the three-tiered system have enabled Maryland retailers 
and restaurants to carry Maryland wines. 162 One local wholesaler 
and one multi-national wholesaler carry four Maryland wines. 163 
The Maryland Wineries Association hosts six annual wine festivals 
serving Maryland wines exclusively.l64 Currently, there are 
twenty Maryland wineries located across the state. 165 In short, 
Maryland consumers have numerous options when purchasing 
local wines. Consumers may attend a wine festival, visit a local 
winery, or even purchase local wines in their neighborhood liquor 
store, enabled by Maryland laws permitting manufacturers to 
circumvent the wholesale system to sell to restaurants, retailers, 
and consumers. 
Further, while Maryland wineries may not ship products 
directly to in-state consumers, they may ship directly to consumers 
living in states that permit direct shipment of wines. 166 The 
Maryland Wineries Association is unaware of any Maryland 
wineries that currently ship out-of-state. 167 If Maryland's direct 
159. Supra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
160. See The Maryland Wineries, Maryland Wine Industry Statistics, supra note 116. 
161. See Maryland Wineries Association, http://marylandwine.com (last visited Mar. 
24,2007). 
162. See Complaint, supra note 119. 
163. E-mail from Kevin Atticks, Executive Director, Maryland Wineries Association 
to Lauren Dunnock, University of Baltimore School of Law Student and 
University of Baltimore Law Review Production Editor, (March 10, 2006, 
21 :27:00 EST) (on file with author). 
164. Maryland Wineries Association, 2007 Wine Festivals, http://www.marylandwine. 
cornlmwalevents/festivals.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). 
165. Maryland Wineries Association, 2007 Wine Festivals, http://www.marylandwine. 
cornlmwalevents/festivals.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). 
166. See Md. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 2-205(a)(3)(i) (2002 & Supp. 2006). 
167. E-mail from Kevin Atticks, supra note 163. 
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shipping laws were amended to permit direct shippin61 on a 
reciprocal basis, sales by direct shipments would increase. I 8 
2. Wholesaler Market's Prejudicial Effect on Out-of-state Small 
Wineries 
Maryland consumers wishing to purchase a moderately priced 
Oregon Pinot Noir listed in Wine Enthusiast's Top 100 Wines have 
two choices-search for the wine in their local liquor store, where 
a Maryland wholesaler mayor may not distribute the wine, or 
board a plane to Portland. 
"The value of the direct sale of wine is estimated at $500 
million with some estimates as high as $1 billion." 169 Small out-
of-state wineries rely on direct shipping to sell their products 
because production is too small for wholesalers to carry their 
wines, while many consumers rely on the Internet to purchase 
wines unavailable in their local liquor store. 170 While in some 
circumstances wine may be considered a substitute good, it is not 
for many consumers. Compare the following scenario: a 
consumer on her way to a party stops at her local liquor store for a 
bottle of wine-any bottle will do (substitute), versus a wine 
enthusiast intrigued by Robert Parker's online rave review of a 
California Syrah who will be content only with this California 
Syrah. For the latter consumer, no other Syrah will do (not a 
substitute). In this situation, Maryland's direct shipment laws 
harm the consumer and the out-of-state retailer. The laws restrict 
competition, inflate prices, and decrease consumer access to goods, 
which are not carried by the wholesaler. 
The out-of-state winery, unlike the Maryland winery, is 
effectively shut out of the Maryland market unless the winery is 
small enough to qualify for Maryland's limited wholesaler permit. 
The Maryland winery is advantaged by location and legislative 
benefit. 171 Thus, Maryland's direct shipment laws constitute 
functional discrimination and are unconstitutional under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause unless the State may demonstrate that 
there are no reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing the 
Twenty-first Amendment's core concerns. 172 
168. Thirteen states pennit direct shipment only if the state of origin also penn its 
direct shipment. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 7. 
169. Molnar, supra note 37, at 173. 
170. Jd. at 184-85. 
171. See Complaint, supra note 119, at 14-16. 
172. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524 (6th CiT. 2003). 
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D. Do Maryland's Laws Satisfy the Twenty-first Amendment's 
Core Concerns? 
Violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause pass 
constitutional scrutiny if justified by a core concern of the Twenty-
first Amendment. 173 Core concerns include "promoting 
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising 
revenue.,,174 This Comment will base assumptions of the State's 
arguments on those used by other states in legal challenges. 
1. Promoting Temperance 
While perhaps a legitimate concern in the nineteenth century, it 
is clear that promoting temperance is no longer a primary objective 
of legislators in this State. While promotion of temperance 
remains a cited goal in Maryland's statement of policy regarding 
liquor laws,175 several of the State's licensing schemes contradict 
this statement. The State issues permits to sell beer, wine, and 
liquor across the State. 176 Permits may be obtained for sales of 
beer, wine, or liquor at wine festivals,177 golf courses, 178 
racetracks,179 and beer festivals. 18o Further, Maryland wineries 
have been permitted to bypass the wholesaler system to sell 
directly to restaurants and retailers since 1951. 181 Considering the 
widespread means in place to sell and purchase alcohol, it does not 
follow that promotion of temperance is a legitimate goal of 
Maryland's anti-direct shipment laws. 
2. Collection of Taxes 
Taxation on liquor sales is a significant source of revenue for 
the State. 182 "Increased direct shipping ... brings with it the 
potential for tax evasion.,,183 In Granholm, Michigan and New 
York state officials cited fear of tax evasion as a primary reason for 
173. See, e.g., North Dakota v. U.S., 495 U.S. 423 (1990) . 
174. Id. at 432. 
175. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 1-101 (2005). 
176. Id. at §§ 3-101, 3-201, 3-301, 6-101, 6-201. 
177. Id. at §§ 8-301 to -314. 
178. Id. at §§ 8-501 to -507. 
179. Id. at §§ 8-601 to -603. 
180. Id. at §§ 8-801 to -805. 
181. See Ted Rouse, Decision on Wineries Hurts Economy, Environment, BALT. SUN, 
Feb. 26, 2006, at 17 A. 
182. U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances by Level of 
Government and by State, 2001-2002, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate 
/022Imdsl_l.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). General revenue for state and 
. local government totaled $32,318,019 in fiscal year 2001-2002. Of that total, 
taxes on alcoholic beverages equaled $25,754 and liquor store revenue equaled 
$162,437. /d. 
183. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 469, 491 (2005). 
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not permitting direct shipments from out-of-state. 184 New York 
required permits for in-state wineries to ship to consumers.18S The 
Supreme Court noted "[i]f licensing and self-reporting provide 
adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the three-tiered 
system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct 
shipments." 186 For example, "licensee~ could be required to 
submit regular sales reports and to remit taxes." 187 
The Court noted several provisions of federal law that ~rovide 
incentives for compliance with state tax collection regimes. 88 For 
example, if a winery violates state law, the Federal Tax and Trade 
Bureau has the authority to revoke the winery's federal license, 
thus preventing the winery from operating in any state. 189 In 
addition, the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act granted 
state attorney generals the authority to sue wineries in federal court 
for violating state direct shipment laws. 19o The Court stated that 
these federal tools, combined with state licenses, "adequately 
protect States from lost tax revenue." 191 
The FTC's report on wine and barriers to e-commerce observed 
that several states permitting direct shipments of wine 192 have tax 
collection mechanisms in place and report "few, if any, 
problems." 193 One such state, New Hampshire, outlined its 
procedures when a shipper is discovered violating the state's tax 
collection laws: "When the N.H. Liquor Commission discovers an 
improper shipment we contact the company and inform them of the 
laws in [New Hampshire]. Once the company learns of [New 
Hampshire] laws they normally get a permit or stop shipping in 
[New Hampshire]." 194 
184. [d. at 463. 
185. [d.at491. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. at 492. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. 
191. [d. 
192. One such state is Louisiana: 
[W]ine may be sold and shipped directly to a consumer in Louisiana . 
. . , provided both that all taxes levied in R.S. 26:341(B) have been 
paid in full and that all of the following apply: ... Any manufacturer 
. . . of winer,] engaging in the direct shipment of such beverages 
under the provisions of Subsection B of this Section shall make an 
annual application to the secretary of the Department of Revenue for 
authority to make such shipments and shall pay the annual tax of one 
hundred fifty dollars levied by R.S. 26:341 (B)(2) prior to selling or 
shipping any sparkling wine or still wine into the state of Louisiana. 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26:359 (2001 & Supp. 2006). 
193. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 4. 
194. /d. at 38. 
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Furthermore, in all likelihood many out-of-state wine shippers 
would voluntarily comply with state tax requirements. 195 For 
example, the Wine Institute, a winery trade association, "indicated 
that 'wineries will embrace any kind of scheme that would require 
the payment of taxation if [they] can simply get access to the 
markets. '" 196 
Finally, there is evidence that some out-of-state shippers 
illegally ship wine to states that do not allow direct shipment. 197 
These shippers are already breaking the law. It is unlikely that 
creating a tax collection regulation will increase the amount of 
illegal shipment; rather, it seems that states would increase tax 
collection by permitting business from honest retailers that already 
abide by the law. 198 
Tax collection, while a legitimate purpose under the Twenty-
first Amendment, could be easily facilitated through non-
discriminatory means. It is a farcical reason to disallow direct 
shipment under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 
3. Preventing Sales to Minors 
In Granholm, Michigan and New York argue that prevention of 
alcohol sales to minors is a legitimate reason for denial of direct 
shipment. 199 The Supreme Court cites as evidence the FTC's 
report that the twenty-six states currently permitting direct 
shipment "report no problems with minors' increased access to 
wine. ,,200 The Court lists several reasons why this is not 
surprising: "First, minors are less likely to consume wine, as 
opposed to beer, wine coolers, and hard liquor. Second, minors 
who decide to disobey the law have more direct means of doing so. 
Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining alcohol 
for minors who ... 'want instant gratification. ",201 In Granholm, 
Michigan and New York were unable to provide concrete evidence 
that direct shipment would increase sales to minors. In short, 
preventing sales to minors does not justify the regulation in the 
face of Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.202 
195. Id. at 39. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. 
199. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,489 (2005). 
200. Id. at 490 (citing Federal Trade Commission, Possible Anti-Competitive Barriers 
to E-Commerce: Wine 34 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2. 
pdf). 
201. Id. (citations omitted). 
202. Id. 
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Furthermore, "the Model Direct Shipping Bill developed by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures requires an adult 
signature on delivery .... ,,203 FedEx's delivery policy demands 
several requirements for shipping wine: First, all packages must 
have an "Adult Signature" sticker; second, recipients must show 
identification proving they are at least twenty-one years of age; and 
finally, signature releases are not permitted, nor are indirect 
deliveries (deliveries made to a location other than the recipient's 
address). 204 
The Court noted that wineries not in compliance with state law 
restricting sales to minors face loss of federal and state licenses, 
providing a strong incentive not to sell to minors. 205 States can 
take less restrictive steps to ensure that minors may not purchase 
wine than banning direct shipment altogether. 206 Thus, in 
Maryland too, prevention of sales to minors is not a legitimate 
reason to discriminate against out-of-state wineries. 
E. Protectionism 
Without additional evidence that Maryland's direct shipping 
laws are intended to promote the core concerns of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, it appears that they are rather intended as 
protectionist policies to aid local winemaking industries at the 
expense of consumer choice, free trade, and the benefits that 
accompany trade, such as lower prices. This conclusion is further 
substantiated by the existence of Maryland laws that benefit local 
wineries. 207 Permitting the smallest out-of-state wineries to sell 
directly to retailers does not negate the effects of protectionist 
policies or solve the problem. Statutes that permit Maryland 
wineries to directly sell their products to retailers and restaurants 
clearly benefit development of the local wine industry. While this 
is a noble goal, regulations cannot promote the interests of in-state 
sellers while unfairly inhibiting the interests of out-of-state 
wineries. 208 Those that do, constitute economic ~rotectionism and 
are forbidden by the Dormant Commerce Clause. 09 
203. Id. 
204. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 22, at 36-37. 
205. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490. 
206. Id. at 490-91. 
207. See Complaint, supra note 119. 
208. See Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). "State laws that constitute 
mere economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as 
laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor." Id. 
209. Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If Maryland enacted anti-direct shipping regulations for other 
consumer goods, those regulations would be struck down as an 
unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.210 
Boutique wine is a product with enormous industry potential; it 
should be treated similarly to other consumer goods. The reasons 
cited by the Supreme Court in justifying discriminatory or 
protectionist policies under the Twenty-first Amendment-
promotion of temperance, tax collection, and preventing sales to 
minors-are not substantial enough to justify the discriminatory 
impact that anti-direct shipping laws have on out-of-state wineries 
and consumers alike.2l1 
The regulations harm local wineries, out-of-state wineries, and 
interfere with consumer choice, enabled by the monopolistic 
interests and political clout of wholesalers and retailers. Courts 
shaping decisions in these cases should consider the interests of the 
consumer and those of free trade and weigh these interests against 
those of the wholesalers and distributors. 
In reforming Maryland policy, legislators should craft sound 
regulations that advance the interests of local Maryland wineries 
while opening the market to both out-of-state wineries and local 
consumers. Maryland should shape its policy based on that of 
states that currently permit direct shipment, such as Louisiana and 
New Hampshire. 212 These states provide a statutory framework 
that permits direct shipping while effectuating simple tax 
collection mechanisms and providing penalties for sellers that do 
not have adequate safeguards for preventing sales to minors.213 
Catering to and working within a system created in an era of 
mobsters and teetotalers is simply not sound policy for the twenty-
first century. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence directs states to demonstrate that 
policies discriminating against interstate commerce must be struck 
down unless the state's interest is legitimate and the local benefit 
outweighs the harm to interstate commerce.214 State laws that 
constitute mere economic protectionism are not saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment.21 Maryland's standard tax collection 
and temperance justifications should not override laws that 
interfere with interstate commerce. Such a policy merely protects 
210. Molnar, supra note 37, at 173. 
211. See supra Part III(D). 
212. See supra note 33. 
213. See supra Part III(D). 
214. See supra Part III(A). 
215. See supra Part III(B). 
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the wholesale and retail industry to the detriment of Maryland 
consumers, local wineries, out-of-state wineries, and the wine 
industry. Thus, courts should apply the Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis posited in Granholm and this Comment and 
conclude that anti-direct shipment laws are unconstitutional. 
Lauren Dunnock 
